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Abstract: We examine whether Vietnamese migrant workers induce different gender roles in housework 
division among their left-behind household members. Using two waves of Vietnamese Household Living 
Standard Surveys (2006-2008), we apply the first-difference method and deploy a simple household fixed 
effects model with instrumental variables for robustness check. We find temporary female migrants are 
associated with a higher probability of undertaking housework by left-behind male members and there is 
a reduction in the gender gap of time spent on chores. However, we find little evidence for a similar 
reduction in the gender gap where household size is altered for other reasons.  
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1.  Introduction  
Between the years 2000 and 2010, structural changes and free trade created probably the greatest job 
opportunities for Vietnamese people far away from their hometowns. The proportion of workers in 
agriculture, aquaculture, and forestry among total salary workers decreased from about 9% in 2002 to (less 
than) 3% in 2006 (2010)1 (Vu and Yamada 2018). The bilateral trade agreement with the US effective in 
2002 and especially access to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in early 2007 boosted growth in the 
Vietnamese private sector. Vu and Yamada (2018) report that the private sector, including foreign-owned 
enterprises (FOEs), surpassed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in terms of employment by 2005. As wages 
increase, Vietnamese people have incentive to leave their hometown to find jobs in other provinces and 
large cities. In our calculation using Vietnamese Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) 2008, 
10.88% of households report at least one member migrating for work, among which 50.66% have at least 
one female migrant. 
Meanwhile, we observe evidence for gains in gender equality in Vietnam in certain aspects. Vu 
and Yamada (2018) find Vietnamese women gain some gender equality in wage, thanks to increasing 
education attainments and higher participation rates in some industries. In particular, FOEs in Vietnam 
have a higher growth rate of female workers than of male workers (Vu and Yamada 2018). Thus, the 
“price,” or bargaining power, of female workers may also have changed in their households. Still, using 
VHLSS 2008, Vu (2017) finds a persistent gender gap in housework division between husbands and wives 
regardless of their economic leverage. In contrast, despite the son preference common in Vietnam (Vu 
2014b), Vu (2014a) shows that a gender gap in housework division between sons and daughters does not 
                                                 
1 The calculation of Vu and Yamada (2018) is based on a selection of individuals who did only one job in 
a year but excluded students, state-employees, self-employed, and working for other households. 
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emerge immediately when Vietnamese children first start doing their chores. These findings call for a 
thorough investigation into intra-household gender equality. 
Our study examines the gender gap in housework division among left-behind family members in 
the absence of temporary migrants, using Vietnamese rotating household surveys between 2006 and 2008. 
To the best of our knowledge, our study would be the first to examine this gender gap. We extend existing 
literature with three questions: First, we ask whether the average gender gap in housework division among 
existing members would be altered after a decrease/increase in the household size. Second, we ask whether 
female and male migrants have different effects on this gender gap. Third, we ask whether temporary 
migration and traditional reasons for household size changes produce different results in this gender gap. 
More specifically, we use individual fixed effects with robust household clustered variance and 
regress linear probability of hour of undertaking housework on reasons for the household size change. We 
create interaction terms between these reasons and the gender of the individual to examine the gender gap 
on the housework division. We also deploy a simple robustness check using a household fixed effects 
model with two instrumental variables, the number of migrants in the district of the household and the 
number of foreign affiliated firms located in the province. We find the gender gap in housework division 
varies inversely with households having temporary female migrants. Left-behind males increase their 
involvement in housework and spend more time on it. However, we find little evidence for a reduction in 
this gender gap arising from other reasons for household size changes. We propose several possible 
explanations for the statistical results. 
Our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 explains the 
data and our sample selection strategy, and Section 4 covers our econometric methods and specifications. 
We report the results in Section 5 and discuss the results and conclude in Section 6. 
2.  Related literature  
Rich literature has investigated the bargaining power and the division of time on housework between 
husband and wife. Two famous models in economics to explain the division of time are intra-household 
bargaining power (Becker 1981; Hersch and Stratton 1994) and the collective model (Browning and 
Chiappori 1998; Browning et al. 2014)2. However, the two models are not always able to explain for a 
persistent gender gap. Alvarez and Miles (2013) find the majority of the gender gap among Spanish dual-
earner couples can be explained by gender-specific factors instead of their observable characteristics. In 
Vietnam, even where the husband has lower education/income than his wife, the gender gap on chores is 
persistently significant (Vu 2017). Moreover, in developing countries where household size is commonly 
larger than 2 and various in composition, the average gender gap on chores among household members is 
less likely to be explained at all.  
                                                 
2 See Foster and Stratton (2018) (and Vu 2017) for further literature review on the division on housework 
among couples including sociologists’ theory. 
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Besides, substantial existing literature examines left-behind members in the household with 
migrant workers. Left-behind members can be children and/or parents of the migrants. Outcomes are 
education, consumption, time-use, and health of the left-behind members. 
In the short run, however, left-behind members suffer negative outcomes (Gibson et al. 2011). 
Antman (2011b) suggests that financial hardship during the father’s migration (to the U.S.) decreases study 
hours and increases work hours among Mexican children. The effect is the most significant for boys aged 
12-15. Studies using Chinese household data find similar stories. Parental migration has a negative effect 
also on children’s school enrollment (Wang 2014), cognitive achievement (Zhang et al. 2014), and height 
and weight, particularly among young children and where both parents migrated (Lei et al. 2017).  
However, the consequences might not be the same in all countries. Gibson et al. (2011) do not 
find significant effects on the probability of studying, literacy, and health measures among left-behind 
Tongan children, likely due to country-specific factors, such as a high human development index. Similarly, 
the consequences also depend on whether the mother or the father migrates (Rizzica 2018). Rizzica (2018) 
finds either remittances or the reallocated consumption from a migrating Indonesian mother would 
maintain the same household expenditure for her children. In contrast, Cortes (2015) shows children of a 
migrating Philippina mother lagged behind in school even after accounting for remittance. 
Impacts can, however, be positive in the long run because remittances can offset the negative 
impact on left-behind members. Antman (2012) indicates a Mexican father’s migration to the U.S. during 
his daughter’s early life correlates with an additional year of schooling for her. Antman (2012) also argues 
that migrant remittances compensate the daughter in the long term. Antman (2011a) suggests an additional 
insight about how the remittance works: The left-behind wife controls the household expenditure and gains 
more power in allocating household resources. Antman (2011a), Duflo (2003), and Thomas (1994) suggest 
the gain is associated with benefits for girls rather than for boys.  
Meanwhile, studies on time-use, especially on chores among left-behind members, to the best of 
our knowledge, are rather limited in number compared with studies on education. All find an increase in 
domestic work (unpaid housework) among left-behind members. Mendola and Carletto (2012) show 
international migration by family members reduces a female’s paid work but increases her unpaid work in 
Albania. Meanwhile, Mu and Van de Walle (2011) show left-behind Chinese women do more farm work. 
Similarly, left-behind Chinese elderly and children do more both farm work and domestic work (Chang et 
al. 2011).  
We note here that previous studies often consider locations where male migrants are dominant 
compared to female migrants; therefore, the left-behind member making household expense decisions is 
more likely to be female. As the result, her bargaining power increases because of missing “important” 
male member at home. Upon the return of the male migrant, he takes over the decisions and sets back the 
previous condition, as Antman (2011) suggests. Thus, the gain in female bargaining power may be 
temporary. In contrast, we are interested in investigating whether this gain is more stable where migration 
occurs with less gender-specific selection – Vietnam. 
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3.  Data 
We analyze data from two waves (2006 and 2008) of the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey 
(VHLSS), whose design is the same as the Living Measurement Survey Study of the World Bank. The 
General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) conducted this country-representative survey based on a 
master sample every two years. The master sample is based on two-stage stratified sampling 3  and 
consisted of 3,063 communes/wards. All enumeration areas (EA) in the two VHLSSs are randomly 
selected from EAs of Vietnam Population and Housing Census 1999.  
The nature of the VHLSS is a rotating basis. Its subset samples (for different statistical purposes) 
are also country representative. Fifty percent of EAs in each commune/ward are designed to have all their 
households re-surveyed in the following wave. The re-used EAs should not have been used in the preceding 
wave. Since EAs are randomly chosen, the old fifty percent and the new fifty percent would be also country 
representative 4 . We take subset samples dedicated for Household Income and Expenditure 5 
questionnaires in both 2006 and 2008. There are 9,189 such households in both VHLSS 2006 and 2008.  
VHLSS 2006 and 2008 required information from each household member. The key information 
for this study is from Question 26 and 27 in Section 4A of VHLSS 2006 and 20086. The former question 
asked whether the individual (age>5) did any housework. If the answer is yes, the latter question asked 
how many hours on average the individual worked per day in the 12 months prior to the survey. GSO 
defined housework as “cleaning, shopping, cooking, washing clothes, fetching water and wood, and 
repairing tools” in both waves.  
VHLSS 2008 (Section C) collected information on individuals who were living away from the 
household to work for (at least) 6 months in last 12 months prior to the survey. GSO indicated that these 
people might return to the household in the future. Therefore, we define those people as temporary migrants 
(TM). We find Vietnamese TMs are a young generation 7 since 86.8% of them are children of the 
household heads. 10.7% TMs are international migrants while the rest are internal migrants (9.1% to other 
districts of the same province, 7.8% to Hanoi, 37.2% to Ho Chi Minh city, and 35.2% to other provinces). 
If the destinations are other provinces (abroad), the number of male TMs almost doubles that of female 
                                                 
3 GSO selected communes first, then enumeration area. It is stratified on province and urban/rural areas, 
proportional to the square root of the number of households (See detailed explanation at 
microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2306/download/34486) 
4 We also do a simple check by comparing some key information such as age, gender, province, urban/rural, 
probability of doing housework, hours spent on housework using Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-
distributions test between individuals in my identified-repeated households and the initial 9,189-household 
sample (2006 and 2008). The test results do not show a statistically significant difference between the two. 
5 The information on housework is on the questionnaires.  
6 The two questions were no longer included in VHLSS 2010-2016. 
7 90% of them < 35 years of age, 75% < 29 years of age, and 50% <25 years of age. 
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TMs. For other destinations, the number is almost the same between male and female TMs. Besides, 48.9% 
TMs migrated alone while 30.1% (15.4%) among households with TM(s) had two (three) TMs. 
The two waves also have information about new household members (compared with 2006) 
including newborns, people moving in for marriage, etc. GSO also collected information on household 
members who are not TMs but have moved out of the household. GSO specified cases such as household 
split (to set up new household): moving to another household for marriage, deceased, and leaving the 
household for studying.  
In VHLSS 2008, GSO recorded the household identity coded in VHLSS 2006 in Section 1D and 
provided reasons why those people surveyed in 2006 are not in the household8. GSO recorded the 
individual identity used in VHLSS 2006 in the data 2008 and even kept a record in the VHLSS 2008 for 
checking the consistency of the individual/household to avoid input errors. We can therefor identify 
households with its members who were picked up twice by the GSO9. In addition, we also re-check the 
consistency among GSO-matched households by using the gender, year, and month of birth of the 
individual in addition to GSO household and individual identities. We omit households with missing and/or 
unverified information. We are able to identify who appears in both waves, and who are newborns (age<2), 
newcomers, temporary migrants, and gone members (other than temporary migrants) in 2008.  
We omit all individuals that moved in and out of the household after 2006, including temporary 
migrants in 2008, and mark the corresponding households with a set of dummies as in Table 1, so our 
selected sample of individuals are a balanced “panel.” Furthermore, we remove children aged < 6 in 2008 
and their corresponding information in 2006 because they were not asked about housework, but we do put 
a dummy for those families having children in this age cohort (between 2 and 5). Finally, we have 3,484 
households (with 11,578 individuals10, which we define as “left-behind household members”) as seen in 
Table 1. Among 379 households with TMs, 192 households (about 50%) have female TMs. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
                                                 
8 In the raw VHLSS 2008, among GSO-recorded individuals, about 10.3% is due to “deceased” and 77% 
is due to moving to other household or household split (among which, 26% for marriage, 37.6% for 
household split, and 24.3% for working). However, we note that GSO did not completely cover all 
individuals of households surveyed in 2006 in VHLSS 2008 in the Section 1D. To the best of our 
knowledge, the records are about one third of total cases. Therefore, we assume composition of reasons 
for gone members (as our definition) in the selected sample is similar to the GSO-recorded sample. 
9 GSO recorded 0.15% of individuals among households surveyed in 2006 was not able to be identified in 
2006. GSO identified 3,926 households in both 2006 and 2008. 
10 Besides, we find some members who appeared in 2008 but were not asked in 2006 and not marked with 
the reasons to appear in 2008 survey. This might be because GSO asked for the reasons that individuals 
stayed less than 6 months in last 12 months prior the time of survey. We put them also as newcomers.  
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The VHLSS 2006 and 2008 also contain rich information on paid work including working hours, 
ownership of the employers, illness and absent days (when the individual cannot do routine work), and 
household appliances. We use the information of appliances purchased only during 2007-200811.  
We compare stable household members (left-behind members) among two groups – households 
without TMs and households with TMs – with the detailed descriptive statistics as in Appendix 1. We 
acknowledge that the real monthly per capita income and age composition are statistically significant 
between the two groups in the baseline 2006 and will discuss this in a later section.    
In addition, we compare the case of households without any TMs and households with female 
TMs in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
We note the difference is minor between the two groups in the baseline 2006 in terms of the probability to 
do housework and of hours spent on housework. Even when dividing male and female left-behind members, 
we find the differences are statistically insignificant in both the baseline mean and distribution of the two 
outcomes. As seen in Table 2, t tests and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality of mean and 
distribution among the two groups support our arguments. However, in 2008, left-behind male members 
among household with female TMs in 2008 have a higher probability to undertake housework and spent 
more time on housework.  
4.  Econometric methods and specifications 
4.1 Individual fixed effects with robust household clustered variance and its 
specifications 
We use individual fixed effects and robust household clustered variance to estimate an association between 
changes in the number of hours per day and the probability of doing housework and a set of independent 
variables among left-behind members in both 2006 and 2008. 
More specifically, linear probability of doing housework (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and similarly hours doing 
housework (𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) of an individual 𝑖𝑖 in family 𝑗𝑗 can be specified in reduced form equations as 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇1ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,    (1) 
𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇2ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,    (2) 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) and ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 ) are vectors of time-variant (time-invariant) 
characteristics belonging to the individual and his/her household, correspondingly. 
We consider the changes during 2006-2008 in the individual fixed effect model 
∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1∆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,      (3) 
                                                 
11 Correlations among new household appliance variables are not an issue (<0.11). Perhaps, households 
have difficulty affording several new appliances at the same time. 
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∆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2∆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,      (4). 
Decisions to send a member out for work are endogenous. The individual fixed effect will remove time-
invariant factors (both observable and unobservable), including some influenced by the TM’s decision to 
migrate. However, we acknowledge that some time-variant factors might remain, which requires at least 
some instrumental variables (IV) to lessen the issue. We propose additional models with IV later in this 
section for robustness-checking purpose. 
Besides, we add a set of interaction terms between the gender of the individual (𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 if 
female, 0 if male) and the changes in the household occurring during 2006-2008. 
∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1∆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜗𝜗1𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × ∆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,  (5) 
∆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2∆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜗𝜗2𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × ∆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,  (6). 
The interaction terms indicate average differences between female and male left-behind members 
corresponding to the change in the household during 2006-2008. It shows changes in hours doing 
housework and the probability of doing housework by female compared with male members. For example, 
if 𝜗𝜗2 < 0 , the female left-behind member does less housework compared with the male left-behind 
member. 
As seen in Table 1, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  provides information on serious illness and other reasons leading to 
individual’s absence in routine work (including housework). 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  also covers ownership types of 
individuals’ employers. During 2006-2008, Vu and Yamada (2018) show the rise of private sector over 
public sector in employment. They also indicate work hours in a year are increasing in the private sector. 
Therefore, we predict that changes in the ownership of their employers (possibility of moving to a new 
job) would change the individual’s available time spent on things other than working, including time on 
housework. The changes might also alter time allocation settings in the family. Therefore, we add an 
interaction term between ownership of employers and gender of the individual to estimate how the gender 
division of housework has changed. We include number of hours of paid work in last 12 months prior to 
the survey as another control variable.  
The variable ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  contains information on the household with possibility of change in 
2006-2008. For example, whether the household has TMs for work, new-born members, children age<6, 
newcomers (due to marriage/merging household), gone members (due to decease, studying far way, setting 
up new households and other reasons), and information for each new home appliance the household 
purchased during 2007-2008 (including freezer, washing machine, gas cooker, rice cooker, vacuum cleaner, 
microwave oven, water pump, power generation and sewing machine). Vu (2017) reports the 
electrification rate in Vietnam was almost 98% by 2008. Therefore, sample selection bias (home appliances 
are purchased conditional to the availability of housing space and electrification) could be assumed to be 
minor. 
4.2 Gender gap estimation using household fixed effects with instrumental variables 
We use instrumental variables to deal with the endogeneity of female migrants. However, this is just for 
robustness check of our previous estimations.  
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We calculate an outcome as an average gender gap in hours spent on housework per person in 
each household. This gender gap is among left-behind members only. The outcome (𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is 
formed from the total hours spent by female left-behind members on housework minus the corresponding 
time spent by male left-behind members, then divided into total number of left-behind members. The 
independent variable includes a dummy whether the household has a female migrant (𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). 
𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜔𝜔1𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ,      (7). 
Following suggestions by Atman (2011), Chang et al. (2011), and Mendola and Carletto (2012), 
we deploy two IVs. 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the average number of migrants in the district where 
the household is located (calculated from the VHLSS). We use 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑜 𝑔𝑔𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  located in the province of the household but lagged for 
a year prior the survey. This information is similar to the calculation from Vu and Yamada (2017b), using 
the data of Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) 2005 and 2007. We count firms having more than 9 
employees. 
5.  Results 
5.1 Gender of temporary migrants and gender housework division among left-behind 
members 
In general, a temporary migrant is associated with a reduction in time spent on housework among left-
behind household members. This is 15 minutes or about 25% lower.  
However, whether migration is a burden/loss in terms of housework for left-behind members 
depends on gender of the TM. Interestingly, where TM is female, the gender-specific re-allocation of time 
shows a compensation from left-behind male members. The interaction term (Female TM × Gender), as 
seen in Column 7 of Table 3, shows that left-behind male members become more likely to do housework. 
In terms of time, the gender gap is improved by about 17.5 minutes for the left-behind women, as in 
Column 8 of Table 3. We have strong evidences as shown in Table 2 that left-behind male members, rather 
than left-behind female members, altered their behaviors.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Whether TMs can influence the left-behind members by remittance should be considered. One of 
possible mechanisms is that the family uses received remittances to buy home appliances. We check the 
correlation between appearance of newly purchased appliances and the event of temporary migration, but 
the correlations are apparently low (-0.025 to 0.06). In addition, we also consider whether net remittance 
by TMs might help households to buy new appliances. However, the net remittance (remittance received 
by the household minus from-the-household-to-temporary-migrant money) were less likely positive. 
About two thirds of TMs have negative or zero net remittances. The mean net remittance is about VND 2 
million (USD 123) per year while the average price at the time of purchase (for all appliances) was 
approximately VND 860,000 (the survey has information on the price of each item at the time of purchase). 
Even correlations between gross remittance and newly purchased appliances are low (<0.043). TMs 
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probably have just left home, so they might not have enough income or savings to offset the initial cost 
from their families.  
Certainly, the household may have used the gross remittance for purposes other than buying new 
appliances with a female TM involved in the decision of her left-behind family. By raising female 
bargaining power in her family, a female TM can indirectly/directly influence the housework division 
among left-behind members. The results of a small-scaled survey (600 migrants to Hanoi in 2010) by Tran 
(2011) supports this argument. Tran (2011) found 82% of migrants’ left-behind families used up all or part 
of the remittance for daily expense purposes, while 52% spent on buying furniture. Other purposes of 
spending the remittance had even lower percentages (wedding, funeral: 51.1%; education: 41.9%; 
constructing and repairing houses: 26%; paying debts: 24.5%). Besides, Tran (2011) also found that rather 
than use postal or banking services, migrants were more likely to bring remittances in person when they 
came home12. Indeed, Tran (2011) recorded that female migrants participated as much as male migrants 
in decisions about how remittances should be spent.  
Another possible mechanism is that the perception of female “price” might have changed. This is 
because a female TM can generate a higher economic value than she could when she was in the household. 
However, we acknowledge that limited information in the household data on how remittances were used 
prevent us from further extrapolation. 
Furthermore, we note that the majority of migrants (86.8%) are children of the household head, 
so it is less likely that the one who controlled and decided household expenditure has changed. Therefore, 
the gain in gender equality in this specific context may last longer than the case where male migrants are 
dominant.  
5.2 Temporary migrants and other reasons of household size changes  
In this part, we compare other reasons for household size changes, including gone members, newcomers, 
and newborn children (<2 years old). 
In contrast with the case of TMs, if some members have left the household for other reasons, the 
remaining members have to spend approximately 20 minutes more on housework (as seen in Column 4 of 
Table 3) with little evidence for a gain in equality in gender housework division. First, the difference in 
housework hours among left-behind members between the case of female and the case of male gone 
member is statistically insignificant (column 5 and 6 of Table 3). The same is true for the probability of 
doing housework. Second, gender housework division shows different results. Left-behind male members 
do not compensate. Instead, left-behind female members are more likely to do the housework (see the 
interaction term between Female gone-member × Gender in column 7 of Table 3).  
As mentioned in footnote 8, the majority of cases other than TMs are marriage and split-household, 
which does not link to direct economic gains or losses. Thus, intra-household bargaining power does not 
                                                 
12 If this is true nationwide, the recorded remittances from VHLSS might have been underestimated. 
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alter. As the result, intra-household rule for gender specific housework division would stay the same. This 
agrees with the persistent gender gap found by Vu (2017). Remaining female members are more likely to 
take up the chores left-behind by female gone members.  
Also, if household has newcomers, we find a decrease by about 7.4 minutes of housework 
(13.4 %) (see corresponding coefficients at column 4 of Table 3) among any existing members in the 
family. However, the gender gap might not have any connection with the gender of the newcomers. 
Existing female members enjoy 12.8 minutes less of housework if the newcomer is female. However, we 
argue that this reduction would not be due to an increase in time or involvement from existing male 
members. Instead, that could be thanks to the new female members. The basis for our conjecture is as 
follows: About 20% “gone member” is for marriage. As seen in Table 1, 73% (0.247/0.339) of newcomers 
are female. Therefore, the newcomers are very likely new brides. When a new bride comes, she might play 
her gender role and do gender-specific housework. As the result, the burden of housework on existing 
members, especially females, reduces. 
We also have different results and interpretations in the cases of newborns in 2007-2008 and of 
children aged 2-5. In both two cases, we find increased work for female members. Having a newborn is 
associated with a higher probability of doing housework among existing female members (see column 7 
of Table 3). Perhaps maternal leave plus the burden of caring for the newborn fall on the mother. She might 
have more time to be at home and more reasons to participate in housework related to her child, which is 
one possible explanation. Additionally, having a child aged 2-5 is associated with more time on housework 
for existing female members but does not necessarily need more involvement of all members13.  
5.3 Other results and simple robustness check 
As mentioned, the period 2006-2008 also witnessed job movements as the private sector rocketed and 
structural changes took place. If individuals are newly employed by the private sector, they are less likely 
to do housework. Their time on housework is reduced. Especially if they are female, they are released 
significantly from their housework burden (see column 7 and 8 of Table 3). 
Interestingly, individuals do not alter their housework if they are newly employed by SOEs. 
Perhaps the work schedule in SOEs is limited to 40 hours per week. Vu and Yamada (2017a) report the 
mean total work hours during 2002-2014 of non-SOE employees is more than 40 hours per week and 
increasing, while that of SOE employees is closer to the standard 40 hours per week and stable. This 
statistical point would support our conjecture. Another possibility is that time spent in SOEs may not be 
well monitored, so SOE employees might have more free time compared with non-SOE employees.  
The result of using household fixed effects with IVs and robust household clustered variance 
confirms previous results obtained by using individual fixed effects (see Table 4). We divide these into 2 
cases: A) comparing between households with female TMs and households without any TMs (column 2 
and 3); and B) comparing between households with female TMs and households without female TMs 
                                                 
13 The definition of housework in the survey does not include childcare. 
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(column 4 and 5). The results are statistically robust in both cases and confirm our previous corresponding 
estimations. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
6.  Conclusion and Discussion 
In this study, we examine whether temporary migrant household members might cause a shortage of labor 
for domestic work and induce different gender roles in housework division among left-behind members. 
We use VHLSS 2006-2008 and individual fixed effects to remove time-invariant observable and 
unobservable factors. We also deploy a simple household fixed effects model with two instrumental 
variables to perform the robustness check. We find the gender gap on chores shrinks in the case of female 
TMs, thanks to more efforts of left-behind male members. However, we have little evidence for similar 
conclusions in the gender gap due to other reasons for household size changes. Except in the case of TMs, 
existing male members would not alter their behavior on housework.  
Moreover, our results have some policy implications. The gain in gender equality among left-
behind members implies that involvement in paid work of females will also raise the “value” of other 
women in the family. Men, who decided to stay, would involve themselves more in housework. With more 
paid jobs for women, intra-household gender equality would increase naturally, and the social norm that 
only women should do housework would change gradually. Thus, policies that facilitate women with paid 
work would reduce the intra-household gender gap in housework division. Besides, the unchanged time 
spent on chores among females who have become SOE employees suggests a gap in time-use control 
between SOEs and other firm ownerships.  
Finally, we acknowledge several drawbacks of this study. First, as suggested by Gibson et al. 
(2011), our study has the potential issue of double sample selection bias (households self-selected to 
migration and gender selection among migrants). For the first selection bias, we acknowledge a 
complication in the difference between households with and without TMs, and differences in average 
monthly per capita incomes in the baseline 2006 are significant (see Table 2)14. We also have more than 
one endogenous variable. Our robustness check specification using IVs is just valid for the simplest case, 
and finding enough IVs for all cases is a luxury. Even if we are lucky to have enough, the issue of time-
variant omitted variable bias is just lessened rather than eliminated. Second, we have not yet obtained a 
sufficient measure to deal with censoring data on number hours on housework. Third, we are unable to 
have post-migration data to examine whether the gain in gender equality might be reset.  
Nevertheless, we still have two reasons to secure our results. First, we test for mean difference in 
housework hour undertaken by the two groups (and by gender separately) in the baseline 2006 as seen in 
Table 2. The lowest p-value for H0: difference = 0 is 0.201. Thus, the difference between the two groups 
on housework hours cannot be rejected from being the same in the baseline 2006. In addition, two-sample 
                                                 
14 Prior to migration, the households with TMs have lower average income but larger household size 
compared with households without TMs in 2006.  
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests further strengthened that the two outcomes in two groups in the baseline are 
equally distributed, as in Table 2. This may suggest that the decision on migration does not alter the time 
allocation on housework per person (or by gender) at the baseline (prior the event of migration), despite 
significant differences in income and household size. Second, the other selection bias may not be serious. 
50.66% (192/379) of households with TMs have at least a female TM. Similar tests show the difference in 
gender composition among the two groups: households with female TMs and households without TMs in 
the baseline in 2006 is not strongly rejected (as shown in Table 2, the p-value is 0.098). Thus, we leave all 
remaining drawbacks for our future agenda. 
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Appendix 1. Mean comparison between left-behind members in households without (1) and with 
(2) temporary migrants in 2008 
 
 2006   2008   
Variable (1) (2) (1) – (2) (1) (2) (1) – (2) 
   P–value   P–value 
Among left–behind members       
Number of consistent remaining members 
 in 2006 and 2008 
10,497 1,081  10,497 1,081  
  Number of households 3,105 379  3,105 379  
  Doing housework (1=yes, 0 otherwise) 0.671 0.726 0.000 0.682 0.740 0.000 
  Hour per day for housework 1.254 1.287 0.404 0.795 0.798 0.939 
Average gender gap in the same household  
on hour per day for housework 
0.831 0.667 0.107 0.592 0.327 0.000 
  Year of birth 1973.7 1969.9 0.000    
  Gender (=1 if female, 0 if male) 0.508 0.503 0.781    
Among left-behind male members       
Number of members 
 
5,168 537  5,168 537  
  Doing housework 0.571 0.631 0.000 0.570 0.680 0.000 
  Hour per day for housework 0.854 0.912 0.175 0.510 0.585 0.040 
Among left-behind female members       
Number of members 
 
5,329 544  5,329 544  
Doing housework 0.768 0.819 0.000 0.790 0.800 0.599 
Hour per day for housework 1.643 1.656 0.818 1.072 1.009 0.357 
 
Note: (1)-(2) used two-sample t test. 
 16 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for left-behind members and their households 
 
 2006   2008  
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Individual information (11,578 individuals)     
  Hour per day for housework 1.257 1.212 0.796 1.244 
  Doing housework (=1 if yes; =0 if otherwise) 0.676 0.468 0.687 0.464 
  Gender (=1if female; =0 if male) 0.507 0.500 0.507 0.500 
  Year of birth 1973.3 19.4 1973.3 19.4 
  Paid work hour (in 12 months) 982.0 1017.2 1012.8 1012.3 
  Working for SOE 0.060 0.237 0.061 0.240 
  Working for FOE 0.008 0.089 0.012 0.110 
  Working for private firm 0.023 0.149 0.023 0.149 
  Absent (Days in a year out of routines) 4.278 15.205 4.091 17.320 
  (Serious) Illness (Days in a year)  1.321 10.296 1.655 14.744 
Household information (3,484 households)     
  Household size 4.821 1.683 4.194 1.660 
  With temporary migrant (TM) 0 0 0.109 0.311 
  With female temporary migrant (female TM) 0 0 0.055 0.228 
  New born members 0 0 0.078 0.269 
  Children <6 years old 0.271 0.445 0.194 0.396 
  New comers in 2008 0 0 0.339 0.473 
  New female comers in 2008 0 0 0.247 0.431 
  Gone–member 0.328 0.470 0.000 0.000 
  Female gone–member 0.229 0.420 0.000 0.000 
Newly bought home appliances 2007–2008     
  Freezer  0 0 0.062 0.241 
  Washing machine  0 0 0.024 0.153 
  Gas cooker  0 0 0.060 0.238 
  Rice cooker  0 0 0.088 0.283 
  Vacuum cleaner  0 0 0.003 0.054 
  Microwave oven  0 0 0.003 0.051 
  Water pump  0 0 0.030 0.172 
  Power generation  0 0 0.003 0.051 
  Sewing machine  0 0 0.004 0.061 
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Table 2 Comparison between left-behind members in households without (1) and with (2) female 
temporary migrants in 2008 
 
 2006    2008    
Variable (1) (2) (1)-(2) KS 
test 
(1) (2) (1)-(2) KS 
test 
   P–value   P–value 
Among left–behind members         
Number of consistent remaining members 
 in 2006 and 2008 
10,497 576   10,497 576   
  Doing housework (1=yes, 0 otherwise) 0.671 0.693 0.281 A 0.682 0.719 0.063 A 
  Hour per day for housework 1.254 1.231 0.651 A 0.795 0.828 0.538 A 
  Year of birth 1973.7 1971.2 0.003      
  Gender (=1 if female, 0 if male) 0.508 0.472 0.098      
Average gender gap in the same household  
on hour per day for housework 
0.831 0.464 0.007  0.592 0.123 0.000  
Among left-behind male members         
 Number of members (*) 5,168 304   5,168 304   
 Doing housework 0.571 0.608 0.201 A 0.570 0.668 0.001 R 
 Hour per day for housework 0.854 0.898 0.435 A 0.510 0.661 0.000 R 
Among left-behind female members         
 Number of members 5,329 272   5,329 272   
 Doing housework 0.768 0.788 0.471 A 0.790 0.776 0.573 A 
 Hour per day for housework 1.643 1.603 0.627 A 1.072 1.015 0.543 A 
Among households         
  Number of households 3,105 192   3,105 192   
  Household size (**) 4.307 4.703 0.001  4.210 3.927 0.022  
Average real  
income/person/month (***) 
1103.5 859.1 0.004  1329.2 1086.1 0.108  
  Freezer 0.213 0.073 0.000  0.298 0.161 0.000  
  Washing machine 0.078 0.015 0.001  0.114 0.026 0.000  
  Gas cooker 0.362 0.151 0.000  0.450 0.312 0.000  
  Rice cooker 0.591 0.479 0.002  0.679 0.708 0.391  
  Vacuum cleaner 0.012 0.010 0.882  0.011 0.026 0.051  
  Microwave 0.012 0 0.128  0.017 0.021 0.692  
  Water pump 0.270 0.193 0.019  0.363 0.318 0.201  
  Power generation 0.007 0 0.242  0.008 0 0.200  
  Sewing machine 0.060 0.068 0.673  0.056 0.057 0.949  
Notes:  
* (1) contains households without any TMs. 
** Number of members surveyed by GSO 
*** Unit: VND 1,000. CPI in use was from the World Bank Data (link: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL?end=2015&locations=VN&start=2000). 
The means of “among households” are calculated with all surveyed members. Dummies for home appliances =1 if the 
household has, =0 if otherwise.  
(1)-(2) used two-sample t test. 
KS test: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions between sample (1) and (2). A 
is when H0 (the two samples are the same) is not rejected. R is when H0 is rejected.  
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Table 3 Probability of doing housework and the number of spent hours 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables Prob (do) Hour Prob (do) Hour Prob (do) Hour Prob (do) Hour 
Household related variables 
        
  TM 0.0163 –0.2463*** –0.0036 –0.2927*** –0.0301 –0.3791*** –0.0317 –0.3774*** 
 
(0.0195) (0.0474) (0.0205) (0.0522) (0.0249) (0.0742) (0.0248) (0.0741) 
  Female TM 
    
0.0896* 0.3397*** 0.0933** 0.3004*** 
     
(0.0474) (0.0995) (0.0475) (0.0991) 
  Female TM × Gender 
    
–0.0833* –0.3630*** –0.0883* –0.2920*** 
     
(0.0481) (0.1095) (0.0483) (0.1113) 
  Gone–member –0.0572*** 0.2423*** –0.0196 0.3313*** –0.0268 0.3350*** –0.0272 0.3308*** 
 
(0.0133) (0.0399) (0.0202) (0.0561) (0.0234) (0.0750) (0.0234) (0.0751) 
  Female gone–member 
    
0.0088 –0.0115 –0.0174 –0.0553 
     
(0.0242) (0.0781) (0.0316) (0.0780) 
  Female gone–member × Gender 
      
0.0554* 0.1013 
       
(0.0296) (0.0717) 
  New comers –0.0500*** –0.2039*** –0.0162 –0.1228** –0.0079 –0.1682* –0.0085 –0.1672* 
 
(0.0146) (0.0434) (0.0197) (0.0600) (0.0248) (0.0916) (0.0248) (0.0921) 
  Female new comers 
    
–0.0140 0.0592 –0.0376 0.1484 
     
(0.0264) (0.0988) (0.0347) (0.1025) 
  Female new comers × Gender 
      
0.0538 –0.2132** 
       
(0.0332) (0.0865) 
 (to be continued) 
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Table 3 (Cont.) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables Prob (do) Hour Prob (do) Hour Prob (do) Hour Prob (do) Hour 
  New born members 0.0040 –0.1909** 0.0324 –0.1249 0.0332 –0.1295 –0.0043 –0.1481* 
 
(0.0210) (0.0786) (0.0231) (0.0879) (0.0231) (0.0877) (0.0332) (0.0862) 
  New born members × Gender 
      
0.0770** 0.0356 
       
(0.0364) (0.1197) 
  Children <6 years old 0.0031 0.0441 0.0126 0.0673 0.0117 0.0670 0.0275 –0.0108 
 
(0.0155) (0.0584) (0.0157) (0.0629) (0.0158) (0.0609) (0.0236) (0.0608) 
  Children <6 years old × Gender 
      
–0.0295 0.1526** 
       
(0.0263) (0.0736) 
  Household size 
  
–0.0283** –0.0673** –0.0278** –0.0666** –0.0284** –0.0674** 
   
(0.0113) (0.0313) (0.0116) (0.0306) (0.0115) (0.0305) 
   New freezer  0.0087 –0.2359*** 0.0108 –0.2309*** 0.0122 –0.2310*** 0.0121 –0.2339*** 
 
(0.0215) (0.0615) (0.0216) (0.0614) (0.0217) (0.0615) (0.0217) (0.0614) 
   New washing machine  –0.0085 –0.1529* –0.0054 –0.1440 –0.0071 –0.1449 –0.0056 –0.1459 
 
(0.0318) (0.0878) (0.0316) (0.0882) (0.0319) (0.0893) (0.0319) (0.0892) 
   New gas cooker  –0.0171 –0.1402** –0.0182 –0.1443** –0.0188 –0.1445** –0.0196 –0.1414** 
 
(0.0245) (0.0599) (0.0244) (0.0593) (0.0243) (0.0597) (0.0243) (0.0601) 
   New rice cooker  0.0011 –0.2094*** 0.0007 –0.2095*** 0.0008 –0.2137*** 0.0009 –0.2165*** 
 
(0.0188) (0.0550) (0.0187) (0.0549) (0.0187) (0.0547) (0.0187) (0.0548) 
 (to be continued) 
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Table 3 (Cont.) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables Prob (do) Hour Prob (do) Hour Prob (do) Hour Prob (do) Hour 
   New vacuum cleaner  0.0074 0.0248 0.0019 0.0206 –0.0051 0.0069 –0.0052 0.0224 
 
(0.1294) (0.2525) (0.1314) (0.2597) (0.1325) (0.2657) (0.1326) (0.2622) 
   New microwave oven  0.1887** 0.4740 0.1881** 0.4320 0.1891** 0.4267 0.1887** 0.4448 
 
(0.0886) (0.5279) (0.0882) (0.5179) (0.0875) (0.5178) (0.0875) (0.5295) 
   New water pump  0.0185 –0.1726** 0.0197 –0.1660** 0.0208 –0.1623** 0.0208 –0.1656** 
 
(0.0351) (0.0771) (0.0351) (0.0775) (0.0353) (0.0779) (0.0350) (0.0781) 
   New power generation  0.0438 0.3070 0.0412 0.3141 0.0427 0.3164 0.0404 0.3186 
 
(0.0455) (0.2325) (0.0451) (0.2204) (0.0455) (0.2223) (0.0462) (0.2193) 
   New sewing machine  –0.0665 –0.5891 –0.0606 –0.5696 –0.0631 –0.5607 –0.0678 –0.5422 
 
(0.1315) (0.6117) (0.1357) (0.6199) (0.1331) (0.6315) (0.1342) (0.6267) 
Individual related variables         
 Paid work hour (in 12 months) 
  
0.0000 –0.0001** 0.0000 –0.0001** 0.0000 –0.0001** 
   
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 Working for SOE 0.0208 –0.0527 0.0194 –0.0052 0.0199 –0.0036 0.0019 0.0134 
 
(0.0339) (0.0844) (0.0338) (0.0869) (0.0337) (0.0866) (0.0468) (0.0997) 
 Working for FOE –0.0504 –0.3514*** –0.0571 –0.2993** –0.0563 –0.2984** 0.0171 –0.0721 
 
(0.0464) (0.1271) (0.0470) (0.1281) (0.0470) (0.1281) (0.0803) (0.1535) 
 Working for private firm –0.1173*** –0.3362*** –0.1160*** –0.2882*** –0.1172*** –0.2896*** –0.1062** –0.0790 
 
(0.0347) (0.0886) (0.0348) (0.0885) (0.0348) (0.0886) (0.0452) (0.0953) 
 (to be continued)
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Table 3 (Cont.) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables Prob (do) Hour Prob (do) Hour Prob (do) Hour Prob (do) Hour 
 Working for SOE × Gender 
      
0.0636 –0.0480 
       
(0.0627) (0.1969) 
 Working for FOE × Gender 
      
–0.1212 –0.4508* 
       
(0.0977) (0.2440) 
 Working for private firm × Gender 
      
–0.0256 –0.6147*** 
       
(0.0667) (0.2076) 
 Absent –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0005 –0.0004 –0.0005 –0.0004 –0.0006 
 (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0007) 
 Illness –0.0007** –0.0006 –0.0007** –0.0006 –0.0007** –0.0006 –0.0008** –0.0006 
 (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
Constant 0.7106*** 1.0474*** 0.8341*** 1.4031*** 0.8322*** 1.4021*** 0.8339*** 1.4088*** 
 
(0.0061) (0.0198) (0.0509) (0.1390) (0.0519) (0.1374) (0.0517) (0.1371) 
Observations 23,156 23,156 23,156 23,156 23,156 23,156 23,156 23,156 
R–squared 0.006 0.054 0.007 0.055 0.008 0.057 0.009 0.060 
Number of individuals 11,578 11,578 11,578 11,578 11,578 11,578 11,578 11,578 
Robust household clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual fixed effect is used in all estimations.
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Table 4 Household fixed effects with IVs 
 
Variables Individual 
FE 
Household 
FE 
Household FE 
(with IVs)  
Household 
FE 
Household FE 
(with IVs) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female TM × Gender –0.292*** 
(0.111) 
    
Household with female 
TM 
 –0.132** 
(0.065) 
–3.930*** 
(1.364) 
–0.132** 
(0.065) 
–3.784*** 
(1.384) 
Other variables rather 
than constant term 
Yes No No No No 
Number of Observations 23,156 6,968  6,968 6,594 6,594 
Number of IDs 11,578 3,484 3,484 3,297 3,297 
Under–identification test      
 Kleibergen–Paap rk LM 
statistics 
  25.321  25.324 
 Chi–sq(2) P–value   0.000  0.000 
Weak identification test      
 Kleibergen–Paap rk 
Wald F statistics 
  11.617  11.603 
Hansen J statistic (Over–
identification test of all 
instrument) 
Chi–sq(1) P–value 
   
1.496 
0.221 
  
0.002 
0.966 
Notes: 
Dependent variables: (1): individuals’ number of hours on chores; (2), (3), (4), and (5): differences between 
2008 and 2006 in households’ gender gap on number of hours on chores. (4) and (5) are restricted to 
households with female TMs and households without any TMs. 
Instrumental variables: number of migrants in the district of the household; and number of foreign affiliated 
firms located in the province a year prior the surveys. 
We used a Stata command “xtivreg2” by Schaffer (2010) to implement IV-GMM estimation. 
Robust household clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
